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This work models the competitive behaviour of individuals who maximize their own utility
managing their network of connections with other individuals. Utility is taken as a synonym
of reputation in this model. Each agent has to decide between two variables: the quality
of connections and the number of connections. Hence, the reputation of an individual is a
function of the number and the quality of connections within the network. On the other hand,
individuals incur in a cost when they improve their network of contacts. The initial value of
the quality and number of connections of each individual is distributed according to an initial
(given) distribution. The competition occurs over continuous time and among a continuum
of agents. A mean field game approach is adopted to solve the model, leading to an optimal
trajectory for the number and quality of connections for each individual.
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1 Introduction
In this work we describe the optimal behaviour of individuals who want to maximize their
own utility, expressed in terms of reputation. It is important to consider that reputation is
not an absolute value, but rather a relative one. In order to say whether an individual is
of high or low reputation, it has to be compared with at least another individual. Thus,
competition based on reputation is not based on a value per se, but on the position on a
distribution of reputation. We shall see that this kind of competition based on the comparison
between one’s own position in the state space and the position (i.e. distribution) of the other
individuals suits perfectly the structure and characteristics of Mean Field Game models. In
our model individuals can increase their utility (i.e. reputation) through two instruments: the
number and the quality of connections they have. Thus, the model tries to capture one of the
fundamental aspect of reality, namely the importance of connections.
There are several practical situations that can illustrate this principle. First, consider a
network where individuals are universities trying to improve their reputation. If an unknown
university suddenly establishes partnerships with reputed ones such as Columbia, Oxford,
Stanford, Princeton or Caltech, it is very likely that in a short period of time the perceived
profile of that unknown university will increase sharply, becoming a top university. Here,
this mechanism works as pure signalling: if the University was not very good to start with, it
would never had the chance to partner with such top institutions.
Second, consider a low-skilled worker in a company whose network of relations includes
the CFO, the Directors and other managers. It is likely that his/her salary will increase sharply
in a short period of time, despite the fact that his/her own productivity does not change.
However, his/her reputation (considered as a function of quality and number of connections)
has increased very dramatically.
Third, consider an average firm that suddenly establishes strong connections with some
of the best banks in the world. It is very likely that the reputation of that firm, which in this
case can be expressed in terms of financial stability/performance or just the cost of debt, will
raise significantly.
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Although the three cases described above are quite extreme, the relevance of this study
seems clear: the signalling mechanism underlying the networking strategy will work by con-
sidering the quality of the connections, and not only the number of connections. A university
will always try to establish connections with more prestigious universities; an individual will
always try to be well related to superiors in organizations; and firms will always try to cul-
tivate their connections with natural financing sources. However, these attempts are costly.
Our model tries to understand how individuals maximize their utility (their own reputation)
given the incentives and the costs related to that mechanism.
The field of Mean Field Game Theory (MFGT) was first introduced by Jean-Michel Lasry
and Pierre-Louis Lions (2006a, 2006b, 2007) and later developed by several scholars includ-
ing Olivier Guéant (2009, 2013a, 2013b), whose applications of MFGT inspired the present
work. MFGT was introduced as the limit case of stochastic differential games when the num-
ber of players goes to infinity. The innovative approach of the MFGT is based on the fact that
for the first time an Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and the forward Kolmogorov
equation are doubly coupled. This means that individual behaviours enter in the Kolmogorov
equation, which is not new, and, at the same time, the distribution of agents in the state space
enters in the HJB equation, which is new. This turns out to be extremely useful for modelling
economic problems with a large number of individuals. MFGT does not introduce a new
paradigm, but rather constitutes a mathematical toolbox, enabling to analyse and understand
strategic behaviour of individuals in a previously ignored environment.
The HJB equation expresses the maximization problem for each agent (or class of agents)
in a continuous-time framework. The (forward) Kolmogorov equation enables to analyse and
model how the optimal collective behaviour of the group of agents evolves over time. If these
equations were singularly coupled, the collective behaviour of individuals would simply re-
sult from aggregating the individual optimal behaviour of each agent resulting from the HJB
equation. However, something would be missing in such a setting. In this system, individ-
uals would not take into considerations the actions of other agents when they chose their
behaviour. Thus, the individual actions would be chosen independently and the Kolmogorov
equation would just reflect their aggregate behaviour and how it would evolve over time. Un-
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der the MFGT framework the collective behaviour of agents in the state space enters as an
ingredient in the HJB. Therefore, in the MFGT individuals are affected by the behaviour of
the other agents. In particular, they are affected by the collective optimal behaviour (i.e. the
distribution of agents in the state space) and its evolution over time.
The reason why is called Mean Field Game Theory is the following. First, the “Mean
Field” part of the name comes from the fact that when individuals make decisions they are
not concerned with the action of each individual, but with the distribution of the actions of
all the other agents considered together. The name comes from Physics where the effect
of all the other individuals on any given individual is approximated by a single averaged
effect (a “field”), thus reducing a many-body problem to a one-body problem. Moreover, the
“Game Theory” part of the name comes from the fact that Mean Field Games can be defined
by increasing the number of players to infinity for a certain class of differential games. In
particular, games in which players of the same kind can be interchanged turned out to be the
one that best suited this passage to the limit. The main characteristics (hypothesis) of these
kind of games is called invariance by permutation. Furthermore, Lasry and Lions (2006a,
2006b, 2007) showed that mean field games framework is effectively an approximation of a
game with finite players when the number of players is large and that it is also possible to
know the order of magnitude of the error when a mean field game model is adopted to solve
a game with a finite number of players.
The model in this paper was inspired by the MFGT application presented by Guéant,
Lasry and Lions (2011) describing the interaction between economic growth (measured as
human capital accumulation) and the dynamics of inequality. In that model individuals have
an incentive to improve their human capital in order to increase their wage and to avoid
peer competition (i.e. competition from similar individuals). Although our work has some
similarities with their work, it also has substantial differences. First, the different economic
framework leads to a quite different utility function and costs function; second, our work
adopts two state variables (number and quality of connections) instead of one, and also two
controls instead of one leading to a more complex model to be solved.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, section 3 presents the
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resolution of the model, section 4 discusses the solution and section 5 concludes, pointing
out limitations and suggesting ways to develop the model further.
2 The Model
We assume that individuals want to maximize their own reputation by controlling their num-
ber of connections h within a network, but also the quality q of their connections. We assume
that the utility function should be proportional to qαs h
β
s , where α and β are arbitrary positive
constants, reflecting the (possibly different) weights of number and quality of connections.
Next, let F̄1(s;qs, ls) be the survival function (or tail distribution) of qs at time s, where
ls represents the lower bound of qs (and of hs). The survival function is given by one minus
the cumulative distribution function of qs at time s. As mentioned before for the case of
reputation, the quality of connections strongly depends on the distribution of quality. Thus,
the better the quality of connections that an individual has in comparison with the quality of






Finally, utility should take into account peer competition. The higher the number of in-
dividuals with the same characteristics (same number and quality of connections), the higher
is the competition between them, leading to lower signalling power. Thus, utility should de-
crease with peer competition. We follow Guéant, Lasry and Lions (2011) to introduce the
impact of peer competition in the utility1. Let m1(s;qs, ls) denote the density function of qs
at time s, and m2(s;hs, ls) denote the density function of hs at time s. The utility should then









where C is an arbitrary constant, and µ and ρ weight the relative importance of the state
1Guéant, Lasry and Lions (2011) uses the density function since in his model there was only one state
variable. As in our case we do have two state variables, we might have used a joint density function. Instead we
have assumed separate densities for technical convenience and modelling flexibility.
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variables in peer competition.
Assume that for a given individual the initial values of quality and number of connections










where k and z are the parameters that determine the shape of the distributions, and the ini-
tial lower bound l0 has been normalized to 1. These are survival functions generated by
Pareto distributions. The use of the Pareto distribution is justified as follows. There is a large
number of individuals with low and medium quality connections, a small number with good
quality connections and a number even smaller with very good quality connections. Thus,
the number of individuals with a given quality of connections is clearly a decreasing function
of quality. Few universities have a connection with Harvard, while a larger number of uni-
versities have a connection with New York University and much larger with the University of
Manchester.
Additionally we assume that the initial distribution of the number of connections is a
Pareto distribution. The reason is that there are few universities that have several double
degrees, while most of them have a small number. In particular, most of them have zero
double degrees. The example can be extended to exchange programs using an appropriate
scale. Moreover, there are few firms that have dozens of strong connections with banks, most
of them have a small number. There are few workers that are very close friends with a lot of
other workers or superiors in their workplace (i.e. in the same company or in the same sector
they work), most of them have a small number of very close friends in their workplace.
From the F̄ functions above, the probability density functions for q and h are given by









On the other hand, individuals are constrained in their choice of q and h by a cost function.
In order to understand the cost function it is necessary to first analyse the dynamics for q and
h, assumed to follow the Stochastic Differential Equations (SDEs)
dqs = a(s,qs)ds+σqsdWs (3)
dhs = b(s,hs)ds+σhsdWs, (4)
where a(s,qs) and b(s,hs) are the drift terms for q and h respectively, σqs and σhs are the
diffusion terms for the processes above and q0 and h0 are the initial states. Additionally Ws
denotes the usual Wiener process adapted with respect to a filtration Ft . Following Guéant,
Lasry and Lions (2011) we assume that the optimal drift functions simultaneously solving
the HJB equation and the respective Kolmogorov equations are of the form:
aqs ≡ a(s,qs) = qsγ (5)
bhs ≡ b(s,hs) = hsγ, (6)




2 )s+σWs = q0ls (7)
hs = h0e(γ−
σ2
2 )s+σWs = h0ls, (8)
where ls is a third state variable, which is assumed to follow the SDE
dls = c(s, ls)ds+σ lsdWs (9)
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with l0 = 1 and
cls ≡ c(s, ls) = lsγ. (10)




In what follows we will verify whether this solution is correct or not. In particular, we are
making the hypothesis that the number of connections (h) evolves over time with a constant
common growth rate (γ). Moreover, we are making the same hypothesis for the quality of
connections (q). However, for the quality of connections we are more interested in knowing
how the realization of q is placed under the distribution F(q) and less in its absolute value q.
Next, consider a cost function of the form
H(s,qs,hs, ls) = R
a(s,qs)εb(s,hs)δ
F̄1(s;qs, ls)ω F̄2(s;hs, ls)τ
.
The logic of the structure of the cost function is the following. First, the presence of b(s,hs)
and a(s,qs) means that individuals incur in a cost when they move in the state space. In partic-
ular, these costs depend on the level of q and h reached. According to our guess a(s,qs) = γqs
and b(s,hs) = γhs, increasing the quality and the number of connections becomes harder
when the values of these variables are already high.
Second, the presence of F̄1(s;qs, ls) and F̄2(s;hs, ls) means that when an individual is
closer to the frontier of q and h, it becomes harder to improve them. For instance, consider
the difference in the difficulties faced by a university in establishing its second double degree
today and one century ago, when double degrees did not exist. Thus, given the same value
h, the costs depend on where that h is positioned in the distribution. When the number of
connections is much higher than the number of connections others have, then it is difficult to
increase it, most probably because the environment does not allow it. This applies also to the
case of firms and their difficulty to make strong connections with a large number of banks, as
well as to workers and the difficulty they face in being close to several top managers of the
company in which they work.
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Regarding the quality of the connections, being in the frontier makes it difficult to increase
q, since there are few individuals with higher quality to be connected with. For instance,
Stanford has a tremendous difficulty in increasing the quality of its connections because it is
already connected to almost all top players: its q is already very high. This can be applied
both to firms and their relationship with very good banks, and also to workers and their rela-
tions to very powerful friends. Moreover, F̄1(s;qs, ls) and F̄2(s;hs, ls) cover another important
role in the costs’ function, which reflects the exclusivity of the connections. If a university
has connections of very high quality, then it will be more difficult to increase not only q
but also h (without decreasing q), because increasing the number of connections can make
prestigious universities to lose their status of exclusivity. In addition, when the number of
connections h is very high, it will be more difficult to increase not only h but also q, because
a university with too many connections has difficulty in increasing its quality of connections
due to its lack of exclusivity. This is the reason why universities like Harvard will never have
too many connections in comparison with most of the other universities.
Under the assumption in equations (5) and (6) Guéant, Lasry and Lions (2011) show that
the probability density functions are given by2


















given that qs ≥ ls and hs ≥ ls. As a consequence, the survival function for the general stochas-









2An explicit proof of this result, which was not provided by Guéant, Lasry and Lions (2011), is presented in











given that qs ≥ ls and hs ≥ ls. The equivalent expressions for the deterministic case can be
simply obtained by making σ = 0.
We are now able to write down the Bellman function






[G(s,qs,hs, ls)−H(s,qs,hs, ls)]e−r(s−t)d s|Ft
]
,
which can be rewritten as





















Thus, substituting the values in the functions we get





























The solution for the optimal control problem is given by optimal values for the controls
(which we guessed), the Bellman function and the probability density functions. In order to
arrive to the solution, three Partial Differential Equations (PDEs) have to be satisfied: the
HJB and the two Kolmogorov equations. We start the next section with the HJB equation.
3 Resolution of the Model
3.1 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman is a fundamental element of dynamic programming, which is
a powerful method for solving optimal control problems. This method, first developed by R.
Bellman (1956), consists on a technique for making a sequence of interconnected decisions.
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This technique can be applied to various maximization problems, including optimal control
problems. The fundamental idea of this approach is the following. Take a class of optimal
control problems with different initial time and states. Then, the HJB equation allows to es-
tablish the relationships among these problems and, in the case the HJB equation is solvable,
it is possible to obtain an optimal feedback control by maximizing the Hamiltonian in the
HJB equation.
In addition, it is important to mention that the solution of the HJB equation can be found
either analytically or numerically and the optimal feedback control is a solution that holds for
the whole class of optimal control problems (with different initial time and states), including
the desired problem. Mathematically, the HJB equation is a non-linear partial differential
equation of the first order (in the deterministic case) or of the second order (in the stochastic
































2hl∂ 2hlJ = 0.
Here q, h, and l are points of the trajectories (i.e. a realization of the stochastic processes) qs,
hs, and ls for each time s, with s ∈ [t,∞). Moreover, from equations (5), (6) and (10)
cl ≡ c(t, l) = a(t, l) = b(t, l) = γl,
given our guess a(t, l) = b(t, l) = γl.





























)τ +∂hJ = 0.
Substituting the solution a∗q = γq and b
∗









































which can be rewritten as
ετz = δωk.








It is important to stress the fact that the Hamiltonian has to be a concave function of aq and
bh in order to ensure that we are in presence of a maximum.
Now, we are going to compute the value of the various elements of the HJB equation
∂tJ = 0


















































Notice that cl∂lJ is exogenous in the optimization, since individuals are atomized. Thus,
they cannot affect l(s), which is common for all individuals. Substituting these values into




















































Let us make the following additional assumptions on the parameters
ϕk+µk+ρz = ωk+ τz
α +ϕk+µ(k+1) = ε +ωk
β +ρ(z+1) = δ + τz.
Then dividing both sides of the equation by q
α+ϕk+µ(k+1)hβ+ρ(z+1)
Rlϕk+µk+ρz , and grouping the members















δ (δ + τz−1)+ σ
2
2
(ωk+ τz)(ωk+ τz−1) ε
ε +ωk
+σ2ε(δ + τz)−σ2ε(ωk+ τz)−σ2δ (ωk+ τz)− r
]
= 0. (15)
This equation has a unique positive solution for γ if ε +δ −1− (ωk+ τz) ε
ε+ωk < 0 and r is
high enough. The result will be discussed deeply in section 4.
3.2 The forward Kolmogorov equation
The forward Kolmogorov equation, also known as Fokker-Planck equation, can be defined as
a partial differential equation of the first order (in the deterministic case) or of the second or-
der (in the stochastic case) for the time evolution of the probability density function of a deter-
ministic process or stochastic process. The classical formulation of the forward Kolmogorov








with a given initial condition for m1(0;q0), while for a density function m1(s;qs, ls) of the























+σ2∂ 2ql [qlm1(s;q, l)] ,
with a given initial condition for m1(0;q0, l0).
Let us first focus on the deterministic case. In our model, the initial condition is m1(0;q0)=
k 1
qk+10






















which is always trivially satisfied. Here and in what follows the always satisfied stands for
always satisfied for any s ∈ [t,∞).
In the stochastic case, we have the initial condition (1) and we use the expressions (5),
















































The first term is zero since k l
k
qk+1 does not depend on s. Using equation (7), all the other
derivatives are zero and the Kolmogorov equation is trivially satisfied.
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Moreover, the other condition to be satisfied is the following
m1 > 0,
∫
m1dq = 1 for all s ∈ [t,∞).






































and both conditions are therefore always satisfied. The same procedure applies to m2(s;hs, ls)
by making use of the initial condition (2) and the expressions (6) and (12).
3.3 The transversality condition
Now, we need to verify that the above solution satisfies the transversality condition, which is
a boundary condition of the problem. The transversality condition for our problem consists in
finding the range of values for the optimal growth rate γ such that the integrand is integrable
















































0 . Now, define M =max(ε +δ ,α +β +µ +ρ) .












Thus, the limiting behaviour of L is bounded by
lim
s→∞
L < KlM+1s e
−r(s−t).
By Itô’s Lemma we know that














(M+1)2σ2− r < 0
that is if







Thus, the parameter r has to be high enough in order to satisfy the Transversality condition.
This is in accordance with the condition on r for the HJB equation to have a positive, unique
optimal growth rate γ .
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4 Results
4.1 Presentation of the Results
The results obtained for the stochastic optimal control problem are summarized in this sec-
tion.
The optimal state trajectories for the quality q and the number h of connections grow expo-
nentially as a Geometric Brownian Motion with a drift γ and diffusion coefficient σ
qs = q0ls = q0e(γ−
σ2
2 )s+σWs
hs = h0ls = h0e(γ−
σ2
2 )s+σWs
where, under certain assumptions, γ is positive and unique, and is given by the HJB equation.
Moreover, the Bellman function is given by





and the optimal probability density function is








for the quality of connections and








for the number of connections.
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4.2 Discussion of the Assumptions of the Model
First of all, the guess we initially made on the optimal feedback control is correct and the
optimal growth rate is positive and unique, under some assumptions on the parameters. Thus,
it is important to have a look at all the assumptions made. They are the following.
The first assumption is that there must be a unique Bellman function for the problem.
Since there are two ways of obtaining this function, either through expression (13) or through
expression (14), the assumption that both expressions should coincide imposes the following
restriction on the parameters
ετz = δωk.
Also, in order to get a closed-form solution, we have assumed that the power of q is the same
in all terms of the HJB equation, leading to a restriction on the parameters of the form
ϕk+µk+ρz = ωk+ τz.
Similarly, we assumed that the power of h is the same in all terms of the HJB equation,
leading to
β +ρ(z+1) = δ + τz
and also for all the powers of l leading to
α +ϕk+µ(k+1) = ε +ωk.
Further, the conditions that we have to impose on the HJB solution for the drift γ to be unique
are that
ε +δ −1− (ωk+ τz) ε
ε +ωk
< 0
and a sufficiently large value for r








δ (δ + τz−1)− σ
2
2
(ωk+ τz)(ωk+ τz−1) ε
ε +ωk
.
From the transversality condition, the solution holds if r is sufficiently large,







Despite it seems that this high number of assumptions is a weak point of the model, in fact it
is not. If we look deeply at the constraints we realize that the last two inequalities are satisfied
for r high enough, and that the other inequality can be easily satisfied given the high number
of parameters available. Looking at the equalities above, it is possible to see that we have
4 equations and 11 parameters. Therefore, the model has a very high number of degree of
freedom, which makes it feasible for calibration in empirical studies.
4.3 Discussion of the Results
In this section we describe in words the results obtained above and discuss their fit to reality.
In order to address this issue we start by focusing on the example of universities. One of the
aspects of the solution is that the number of connections of an individual increases on average
over time. In the last century and in particular in the last 50 years the number of connections
between universities (exchange programs, double degrees and partnerships, among others)
increased dramatically. This phenomenon happened for all different types of universities.
Thus, the model is able to explain this fact.
The model also suggests that universities with a low number of initial connections (h0
close to the lower bound) evolve to remain those with the lower number of connections. It is
possible to see this empirically by looking at the evolution of h for very good universities in
the last 30 years. Initially they had a small number of connections in comparison with other
universities, due to their exclusivity. Their number of connections is clearly higher than 30
years ago, but MIT still has much less connections than the University of Granada in Spain.
Therefore, the model is able to predict that a university like MIT had just a few partnerships
in 1980 may be now actively connected with about 30 institutions in 12 countries, whereas
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Bologna University had tens of partnerships in 1980 and it now has around 3000 as reported
in their website.
Furthermore, even extreme cases of top reputation like Harvard have increased the ex-
change programs in the last decades, trying to differentiate themselves through the devel-
opment of very selective double degrees, such as a double-degree in Law between the Har-
vard Law School and the University of Cambridge, or the double-degree between Harvard
Kennedy School and Wharton School, or even those with New York University and with the
Graduate Institute Geneva, among others. In the case, h is measured simply by counting the
number of partners, then our model is not able to distinguish between these selective con-
nections (i.e. double-degrees) and regular exchanges. The lesson is that by measuring the
number of connections, h should also measure the intensity of the connections in order to
better describe the optimal network policy. The expected increase in the number of connec-
tions for a given university may actually result in deeper relations and not necessarily more
partners, reflecting the idea of more intense relationships as just described.
Intensity can be achieved in one of two ways: either by having privileged (stronger) re-
lations with one partner, or adding more relationships with already existing partners. In the
latter case, h would increase without involving other universities. This is a very powerful
idea, which enables us to understand the reason why universities decide to create double de-
grees and enter more strategic alliances and partnerships, instead of expanding the exchange
programs with new universities. In fact, the model tells us that connections are important for
universities. However, the quality of connections is also as important if not more, from the
signalling perspective; in particular, it is more important for high reputation universities than
for low reputation ones, since reputation is supposed to be correlated with q. This effect is
modelled through the presence of the survival function F̄1(s;qs, ls) in the denominator of the
utility. Therefore, high reputation universities have (a) a small, selected number of university
partners and (b) numerous (intense) connections with their few partners. They prefer to raise
h by increasing the intensity of existing connections instead of connecting with new partners,
thus avoiding a decrease of the quality of their connections and of the exclusivity within their
network. Thus, the model is also able to explain this fact.
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Regarding the quality of connections, the result suggests that the absolute value of quality
of connections (q) increases on average over time, while the relative value (F̄1(s;qs, ls)) is
constant over time. This means that the relative quality of connections that a university has
in 1980 is the same as the relative quality of connections it has today. The empirical validity
of these results depends on how the quality of connections is defined. The simplest and most
direct definition of quality of connections is the arithmetic average of the position of the
university partners in comparable rankings. Roughly speaking, a university who had a good
quality of connections in the past is likely to keep a good quality of connections today, while
a university who had medium quality of connections in the past is likely to have medium
quality connections today too no matter how much they have improved - since on average
all players have improved. The reasoning behind this behaviour is that each university wants
to increase the quality of its own connections, relating with high reputation universities and
avoiding bad universities. Thus, bad universities can only enlarge their network with similar
bad partners, creating a separate steady state. Overall, who was bad remains bad, who was
average tends to remain average and who was good remains good and the relative quality of
the connections does not change over time. This is true in the general case and the model is
able to explain it.
Furthermore, the fact that the absolute value of the quality of connections (q) is increasing
over time has its empirical validity in the comparison with the quality of an average university
today and one of a century ago. Considering just the technological facilities available today
in almost all the universities it is possible to understand the exponential nature of the growth
rate in the absolute value of quality. Another proxy for q can be given by the investments
in research of a given university’s partners. According to endogenous growth theory, the
growth rate of the technological innovation in the model by Romer (1990) or the growth rate
of the size of R&D sector in the Jones (1995a,b) critique, which is linked to the increase in
investments in R&D due to the arbitrage condition in the model, result to be positive and
constant over time in order to explain a positive growth rate of the economy. Thus, these
models provide a theoretical and empirical base for the constant growth rate of q.
In addition, there is an ulterior interesting aspect of the result: the impact of uncertainty,
21
as measured by the diffusion term σ in the dynamics of q and h. When this parameter is high,
there is high uncertainty on the future values of q and h. For instance, in the deterministic case
we have σ = 0 and the future value of the variables are known for sure. From the assumptions
on the parameters, it follows that an increase in σ implies a decrease in γ in order to satisfy
the HJB equation in (15). Hence, the growth rate of the quality and the number of connections
depends on the uncertainty level of their future value.
This relation reflects the fact that moving in the state space for both variables q and h at
each time has an increasing cost, meaning that establishing new connections and improving
old ones is increasingly cumbersome. Therefore, in the presence of high uncertainty univer-
sities prefer to limit the expansion and improvement of their connections in order to avoid
excessive and unpredictable costs that can take place in the future. For this reason, when
the uncertainty is high, the optimal drift and the optimal growth rate for both state variables
result to be low.
The solution obtained in the model can also be applied with satisfactory results to the
empirical case of firms and workers.
Regarding alternative modelling procedures, let us share some of our developments. First,
despite the implementation of the model with two different growth rates for q and h, we have
decided not to present the model in that form, since the constraint on the integration of the
Bellman function would have made them directly proportional to each other. Thus, we would
have had two positive and different growth rates for q and h, but at the same time they would
have not led to any enhancement of the model or its predictions. More interestingly we have
considered the possibility of having different growth rates for each individual depending on
the initial value of h0 and q0. This probably leads to a solution where the growth rates will
depend on time, since the lower bound ls will behave differently for hs and qs over time.
However, it is possible that this model will not satisfy the Kolmogorov equation since the
different growth rates can probably lead the distribution to explode as time goes to infinity.
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5 Conclusion
The model developed in this work describes the optimal behaviour of individuals, which in
our case were represented either by universities, firms or workers, in regards to their network
of connections. The solution consists on a continuous increase over time of the number and
of the absolute value of quality of the connections individuals have. Furthermore, given the
optimal effort of each individual, the relative quality of the connections (relative to the qual-
ity of the connections of the other individuals) of each individual remains constant over time.
The empirical validity of the model has been thoroughly described in the previous section,
showing that the model is able to capture different aspects of reality in all the elements of
its solution. For the university case, it has been described how the model can capture the
increase of the number of connections between universities over time, where in our case the
connections between universities can take the form of exchange programs, double degrees
or partnerships among others. In particular, the model is able to explain the reason for the
creation of different types of strategic partnerships and networks between universities. The
model also explains that the most exclusive universities (i.e. universities with a relatively
low number of connections) in the past, are still today the most exclusive ones, despite the
increase in the number of connections. This also holds for the less exclusive universities.
Furthermore, the model is also able to capture the increase in the quality of universities over
time, which appears clear just comparing the facilities provided by an average university to-
day and one century ago. Moreover, the model helps explaining the fact that universities with
good quality connections in the past are the same universities that have good quality con-
nections today; the same applies to medium and low quality universities. Thus, the relative
quality of connections remains constant over time, which we believe to be true in general.
In addition, the model predicts that when there is uncertainty on the future quality and num-
ber of connections then universities tend to limit the expansion and improvement of their
connections in order to avoid excessive and unpredictable costs that can take place in the
future. Nevertheless we suggest further research to improve the simple model developed in
this work.
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There are some evident limitations of the model. One is the constant nature of the relative
quality over time. Under this prediction it is not possible that universities can increase (or
decrease) the quality of their connections over time, because all individuals behave similarly.
One possible way of overcoming this problem would be to consider a model where both the
drift γ and the number h of connections would be a decreasing function of reputation, and
the average quality q of connections would increase with reputation. The model would be
different and the implications in the results are not clear. The other limitation is that the model
is based on a fixed network of universities, not accommodating the impact of newcomers on
this very competitive market. Hence, the model is not able to explain real cases of universities
founded just 40 years ago, which are now connected with prestigious universities around the
world. However, it is possible to say that in the general case the prediction about the stability
of the relative quality of connections holds.
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